

INDIANA'S STRATEGY FOR
**HOMELAND
SECURITY**



Counter-Terrorism and Security Council
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A message from **Lt. Governor Joe Kernan**,
chairman of the Indiana Counter-Terrorism and Security Council

September 11th brought the issue of homeland security to the forefront of everyone's minds. While it caused it heartache and grief for thousands of Americans, it has also made us more wary, more vigilant, and most important – better prepared.

Governor Frank O'Bannon created the Indiana Counter-Terrorism and Security Council with preparedness as its mission. And since its inception in October 2001, it has tackled its charge both aggressively and with great care.

Indiana's Strategy for Homeland Security is the result of more than a year of research and investigation conducted by the Council's members. It is a document aimed at assisting our state's public safety agencies in their planning; it offers guidelines, suggestions and best practices from all over Indiana that can be tailored to fit any community.

The strategy also serves as a starting off point for the Council as we look ahead to the next two years. Clearly, we have made great strides already – but there is much to be done. In partnership with the citizens of the great state of Indiana, we will work hard to continually improve our homeland security efforts.

On behalf of the Council, I would like to express my appreciation for the support and input we've received from hundreds of Hoosiers over the past year. We look forward to building on our successes.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Joe Kernan".

IN MEMORY OF THOSE HOOSIERS WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF SEPT. 11, 2001

"Today, I challenge you as I challenge myself: Tell your children - and other young people -- the stories of the heroes. Those who stood in the midst of destruction to risk and, in too many cases gave their lives to help others get to safety. Tell your children the stories of the officers who ran into the fire to help as others rushed out.

"Tell them the stories of the ordinary Americans on Flight 93 who overcame terrorists on a suicide mission so that others would not die. And tell them of the people who found other ways to help, who reached out to their neighbors to rebuild a nation that will never fall to attacks of hate. Tell them of each of those individuals who made sure our foundation remains strong, that our hearts remain open and that our land remains free."

Frank O'Bannon, Governor
Sept. 11, 2002

Colonel Canfield "Buddy" Boone -- Born February 2, 1948, and raised in Milan, Boone played on the Milan High School basketball team. He graduated from Butler University, where he met his wife, the former Linda Shackelford. He lived with his wife and three sons in Indianapolis from 1970-1991, during which time he also served in the Indiana National Guard. For the last two years Boone had been on active duty, stationed at the Pentagon. At the time of the terrorist attacks, he had just been promoted to the rank of Colonel. The official notification of the promotion arrived in his home mail three days after the attacks.

Gary Bright - Born January 31, 1965, and raised in Muncie, Bright graduated in 1983 from Southside High School. Bright lived and worked in Indianapolis while pursuing a bachelor's degree at IUPUI in 1991. He earned a Master's degree from Indiana State University in 1994 and moved to the New York area. Two weeks before the attack Bright started a new job. His new office was in the World Trade Center.

Eddie Dillard - Born in 1947 in Gary Indiana, Dillard graduated from Gary's Tolleston High School in 1965 and attended Bishop College. He retired from the Philip Morris Company in 1997. Mr. Dillard died aboard American Airlines Flight 77 when it smashed into the Pentagon on September 11th.

Brenda Gibson - 55 years old, born and raised in Indianapolis, Gibson moved to Falls Church, Virginia. She worked as a civilian employee at the Pentagon, where she was at the time of the attack.

Major Stephen V. Long - 39 years old, graduated from Cascade High School. Long joined the United States Army after graduation from Cascade High School in 1981. He was based in Washington, but not at the Pentagon. On the morning of the attacks Long was attending a meeting there.

Lieutenant General Timothy J. Maude, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army - 53 years old, Maude grew up in Indianapolis. He graduated from Latin School, Indianapolis, Golden Gate University, California, and earned a Master's degree from Ball State University. His military education included US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He served overseas tours of duty in Vietnam, Germany, and Korea. Among his stateside assignments were three postings at Fort Benjamin Harrison. During his 33-year career, Maude earned the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, and 5 awards of the Meritorious Service Medal. Since August 1998 Maude had been assigned to the Pentagon as Director of Personnel Management and Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Katie McCloskey - Born December 1975 in South Bend, McCloskey graduated from John Adams High School in 1994 and Indiana University in Bloomington in 1998. She lived and worked in Indianapolis until April 2001, when she moved to New York. Two weeks before the attack she accepted a new job as a computer specialist in an office in the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the first to be hit. Her father lives in Granger.

Stacey Peak - Born and raised in Tell City, Peak graduated from Tell City High School in 1983 and from Southern Indiana University. She worked in Louisville and Houston before moving to New York City in 1999 as a broker for Cantor Fitzgerald where she worked on the 105th floor of the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Moments after the first jet crashed into the building Peak managed to telephone her mother in Tell City and tell her she loved her one last time.

Karen Juday -- An Elkhart native, Karen moved to New York to work for Cantor Fitzgerald on the 101st floor of 1 World Trade Center. Her daughter and sister live in Indiana. Her daughter is Amber Miller, who lives in New Paris; and her sister is Betty Krause, who lives in Kokomo.

Jeannette Winters - Born and raised in Gary, Winters was the first woman killed in combat in Operation Enduring Freedom. A Marine, her casket was carried by eight Marines in a color guard during her funeral at the Genesis Convention Center in downtown Gary. She was 25 and among seven Marines killed Jan. 9, 2002 when a KC-130 tanker plane crashed in Pakistan. She was buried with full military honors at Calumet Park Cemetery in Merrillville next to her mother, who died of cancer in 1997.





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indiana's Strategy for Homeland Security is a roadmap for public safety agencies to use for homeland security. It is organized along critical mission areas and foundations, similar to the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The strategy does not include specific funding requests and is not intended as an assignment to specific agencies. Rather, in the role as facilitator and coordinator, it allows Indiana's Counter-Terrorism and Security Council to clarify its priorities and objectives over the coming 24 months.

The first section of the strategy, Critical Mission Areas, follows a timeline of terrorism events: intelligence and prevention, hardening of targets, and emergency response. The second section of the strategy, Foundations, highlights technology, law and policy issues in the fight against terrorism.

If there is any message to be taken away from September 11, 2001, it is that collaboration-agencies coordinating their planning, training and communication systems is essential. Appendix 6 shows the relationships between strategies on only one level. Many more relationships could be identified, but would render the chart useless; an important reminder that strategies can become bogged down if too much interdependence is required.

In selecting strategies two key methods were used. First, we either convened working groups to advise us on the issues or we collected information from expert and reliable sources. The Governor's Summit on Homeland Security and the National Strategy are examples of both of these.

The second key method was the criteria for selecting items. We chose items based on three criteria: that the strategy was functional, was capable of quality implementation and was flexible because it was integrated.

The first section of Critical Mission Areas - Intelligence, Warning and Counter-Terrorism - recommends a systematic daily watch report that is integrated with the Office of Homeland Security and local private infrastructure and a formalization of support of the state's bomb technicians. This section also identifies the important role federal law enforcement agencies play in homeland security and recommends ways local law enforcement can support them in their endeavors.

The second section on critical infrastructure describes ways to reach out to the private sector and to support them in their actions to protect their assets. Key among these is a mapping and inventory of critical assets and the development of a business case for security management.

The third section on catastrophic events delineates the intensive planning the public health department has undertaken in preparation for a bio-terrorism event. It also includes development of the National Guard for civil support.

The fourth section, emergency response, notes the need for improved baseline emergency response capability by raising the capacity of local emergency response agencies. With 92 different emergency management agencies, we need to work within their local autonomy while developing baseline performance standards. This section also acknowledges the important role Local Emergency Planning Committees have in bringing the community to the table.

The next main section, Foundations, includes three sections.

The first, Technology, identifies five initiatives, of which SAFE-T and an integrated statewide GIS system are two key components.

The second section, Law and Society, identifies the need for mutual aid agreements and the protection of certain public records. This section also recognizes the need to continually review our legal code for ways to better protect society and its liberties.

The third section, Policy and Administration, is focused on the role C-TASC plays in coordinating the strategy. It recognizes the need to integrate support services and project planning between agencies.

Homeland Security is a new field. Security means a lot of things to different people. By trying to do everything, we may achieve nothing. By rooting our strategy in the voice of the public and selecting the best ideas, we can ground ourselves in progress. It is for the protection of Indiana that we serve.

Preface

There is no one way to prevent or respond to terrorism. Arguably, terrorism has been a criminal way of life for centuries and the United States has been a victim of domestic or international terrorism since its creation.

Over the course of events only three certainties about terrorism arise. First, is that its only common denominator is to challenge a lawful deliberation of society. Second, is that although it is a relatively rare event, the long-term trend includes greater casualties and a wider arsenal. Third, is that it will happen again.

Some terrorists are political, others religious. Some act alone, others in international conspiracies. Some are

citizens acting on American soil, others citizens of their own countries acting against American targets overseas. Some use guns and hostages, others anthrax or sarin gas. While some are willing to die during their cowardly act, others run in cowardly fear. The one act they all share is an attempt to strike at society, whether it is its symbols, leaders or assemblies.

September 11th has changed the face of terrorism. Although it is still a rare act, the potential for destruction and mass casualties are now so high as to warrant serious and expedient planning. Over the course of the last decade, terrorists have started experimenting with chemical and biological agents that could result in the deployment of a weapon of mass destruction. Coupled with the decentralization of fissionable nuclear material after the cold war, we must include in our analysis of terrorism the possibility that a rare, but entirely devastating act, could occur. (See charts of acts)

Whether it's because America leads the world in democracy and economic status or because of our modern society in general, we can be certain that terrorists will strike us again.

It is embracing for this heinous act that this report is written and submitted to Indiana's citizens.

CHARTER & GUIDING PRINCIPLES

In early spring 2002, C-TASC issued a Charter to help establish guiding principles and objectives for the Council. (**Appendix 1**).

The goal of C-TASC is to coordinate policies across state jurisdictions and complement national and local initiatives to minimize the risk of terrorism and maximize an effective response to any act of terrorism.

The objectives put forth to achieve this goal are:

- Increase capacity at the local level to deter security breaches and respond to catastrophic events
- Improve criminal justice information and communication systems
- Improve public and agricultural health information and communication systems
- Prepare the National Guard for incident response support
- Prepare emergency responders for catastrophic incidents
- Develop greater public health capacity
- Identify critical assets
- Develop the best practices in protecting people and assets
- Integrate policies into national homeland security efforts

CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?

Many citizens are anxious and distraught over the catastrophic events of 9/11 and anthrax attacks thereafter. The daily reminders of stricter security and the commitment of troops overseas create an uneasy atmosphere.

If we learned one thing from 9/11, it is that the public absorbs candor and can better face the threats of terrorism if they are given the facts. Unfortunately, the question “can it happen here?” has an unfortunate answer. The answer is yes.

Two perspectives should be emphasized time and time again. First, to answer the question whether it can happen here, keep in mind --

It can happen here, and if it does, we'll be prepared and overcome any disruption;
Even if it doesn't happen here, it can be planned or started here, and we'll do what we can to stop it; and
Even if we don't stop an event from happening somewhere else, we'll be prepared to help our fellow citizens by offering emergency support.

Second, merely because someone comes from a Middle Eastern country or has a foreign accent is no indication that they are capable of terrorism any more than Michigan native Timothy McVeigh. Tolerance and respect for different cultures improves our quality of life.

In the face of this troubling atmosphere, it is important for our leaders in all walks of life to set a positive tone of building, growth and renewal. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “We have nothing to fear, but fear itself.”

In selecting strategies, particularly those selected for prioritization or highlighting, three principles were used:

1st Make it Functional All preparation and planning activities should have value for other public safety endeavors, whether it is an all-hazards approach to emergency response or intelligence gathering that includes crimes such as money laundering and drug trafficking. In this manner, we can more easily sustain the tools necessary to fight terrorism.

2nd Impose Quality. There should be quality control on all proposed activities to protect civil liberties, to evaluate for effectiveness and to assure that the activity is not just a tepid response but a meaningful change in operations. Emphasis should be placed on national or industry standards for equipment and technological deployment.

3rd Emphasizes Flexibility through Integration. Activities that allow for integration with other activities, which in turn build on yet others, allow for a stronger, more flexible system. Whether it is interoperability, interchangeable equipment, cross-training or information sharing, the greater the integration, the more flexible the activity is to the challenge it faces.

What follows is a collection of strategies, initiatives and activities which reflect the goal of C-TASC. Some of the strategies are in fact new objectives. With this Strategy we replace the Charter with a plan.

DEADLINE

Is there a deadline for completing the activities? If we are under pending threat by weapons of mass destruction, then why haven't these been enacted already? These are provocative questions that warrant an answer.

Some activities are already underway and are nearing completion. Some activities are less a project to be completed than an on-going process to bring stakeholders to the table. Some strategies are worth prioritizing and pushing forward as quickly as possible. As any measure, the Strategy should be reevaluated regularly to allow for reflection, adjustment and reinvigoration.

HOW THE STRATEGY CAME TOGETHER

The strategy was developed using input from advisory groups, the Governor's Summit, expert opinions, and a review of national trends and practices. Specific acknowledgements are listed in **Appendix 2**.

As Director of C-TASC, I asked three groups to convene to recommend specific action items for the strategy. In addition, as a condition of the Health and Human Services and HEPA bio-terrorism grant, groups have been convened to guide bio-terrorism planning.

All these groups are:

- Agro-Security Task Force
- The Heavy Industry and Utility Task Force
- The Facility Security and Event Roundtable
- The Hospital Preparedness Task Force
- The Bio-Terrorism Preparedness Task Force

On October 2, 2002, we convened the Governor's Summit on Homeland Security for industry leaders, public health officials, local elected officials, and public safety leaders. With over 500 registrants, the Summit held 21 break-out sessions and included plenary speeches by local terrorism expert Peter Beering and Governor Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland Security. It also included 5 break-out sessions that enabled us to receive input from attendees. Those break-out sessions were:

- Agro-Security
- Emergency Preparedness and Law Enforcement
- Heavy Industry and Utility
- Transportation, Event and Facility Security
- Bio-Terrorism Preparedness

Expert opinions were solicited by discussing the strategy with local industry security experts, members of the Council, and federal law enforcement officials. Independent security working groups, such as those of ITOC and INDOT. In addition, C-TASC has worked closely with Peter Beering, Terrorism Preparedness Coordinator for Indianapolis and Adjutant Professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in refining, prioritizing and distilling the important issues in terrorism prevention and preparedness.

When it comes to national trends and practices, this strategy has looked to numerous resources. The major sources of information follow:

- *The National Strategy on Homeland Security*
- *Winning Plays: Essential Guidance from the Terrorism Line of Scrimage*, (Peter Beering, et. al., Harvard University, 2002)
- *The Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan*, the Rand Corporation
- *The Gilmore Commission* (Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction)
- *Oklahoma City 7 Years Later, Lessons for Other Communities*, prepared by Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
- *Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age*, a report of the Markle Founda-

tion Task Force

- *America Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger*, a report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
- The National Governor's Association Best Practices Academy for Homeland Security and Bioterrorism

One national resource should be singled out, the continuation of the Gilmore Commission. Indiana's Director of the State Emergency Management Agency, Pat Ralston, has served on the Commission since its inception in 1999 and is also a member of C-TASC. Director Ralston's commitment to terrorism response planning has resulted in Indiana having valuable resources, such as Indiana's Domestic Preparedness Strategy and the state's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Anti-Terrorism elements.

In addition, many initiatives from individuals, community groups and national organizations are underway as a result of 9/11 and they too are considered and evaluated for action. They are too numerous to mention here.

Finally, a word of appreciation to all the people who assisted in providing input into the State Strategy. It has been a long year with a lot of meetings. The patience and support of our citizens is more than appreciated, it is heartening and the very sign that we are capable of overcoming tragedy and rising to the occasion.

THE COST OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The cost of this strategy cannot be determined because of the hundreds of local, state and federal agencies involved and different variations on the strategy items that can be implemented.

We know the single largest cost, the approximately \$80 million for the interoperable communications backbone, SAFE-T, has already been allocated in a visionary decision by the Indiana General Assembly. The cost of bringing volunteer EMAs up to part-time status alone costs \$350,000. Additional funds would be needed to get some part-time EMAs on full-time status. The same budget issues effect local health departments as well.

Some of the other strategies, such as identifying the importance of urban areas or strengthening LEPCs have no immediate costs associated with them. These are merely forums to improve communication and homeland security operations.

We also know that competition for public dollars is fierce and that everyday that passes without a terrorism attack reinforces any delays in changing the way we conduct public safety.

Mindful of the need to always be cost-conscious, C-TASC should work closely with the State Budget Agency in identifying costs of programs and continually measure the success of the strategies against the investment in them.

ORGANIZATION

Each of the inputs are placed in the appropriate critical mission areas. The critical mission areas are generally those defined by the National Strategy, with some exceptions to allow for the unique place of the State of Indiana in a federal system. In the National Strategy, there are two distinct critical mission areas which we realign as follows:

- “Border and Transportation Security” is combined with “Protecting Critical Infrastructure, Key Assets and Events”
- “Domestic Counter-terrorism” is combined with “Intelligence, Warning and Counter-Terrorism”

In addition, there is a separate section noting Foundations. These are areas that so transcend strategies within critical mission areas that they warrant separation and analysis on their own. Of these, the one we eliminate is International Cooperation. While we note the State of Indiana has overseas offices and prides itself for its international trade, we accept that the U.S. Department of State and foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive reserve most of these activities for the federal government.

We add one foundation, Policy and Administration, to set forth some organizational issues specific to the Council and the administration necessary to further the strategy.

Finally, responsibility for implementation falls on all public safety agencies—federal, state and local. The primary agencies that may be responsible for the implementation, as well as related agencies may be found in Appendix 5.

CRITICAL MISSION AREAS

1. Intelligence Warning and Counter-Terrorism
 - Develop a daily watch report and warning system.
 - Provide support to the state’s bomb technicians.
 - Recognize and support the key role of the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice play in homeland security.
2. Protecting Critical Infrastructure, Key Assets and Events
 - Develop an event and facility security specialty for law enforcement.
 - Create a critical asset identification and monitoring system.
 - Present a clear business case for security and emergency preparedness.
 - Establish taskforces for integrated sectors of the economy.
3. Defending Against Catastrophic Events
 - Prepare for a biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological terrorism event.
 - Prepare the National Guard for homeland security mobilization.
 - Develop robust agro-security response and recovery capabilities.
4. Emergency Preparedness and Response
 - Complete baseline standards for an all-hazards emergency response.
 - Participate in cross-jurisdictional planning and training.
 - Provide opportunities for citizen participation.
 - Expand local emergency planning committees.

FOUNDATION

1. Technology Initiatives
 - Indiana map: Integrated statewide geographic information systems.
 - Safety Acting For Everyone Together—SAFE-T
 - Indiana Emergency Response Network—INERN
 - Criminal Justice Information Systems—CJIS
2. Legal and Social Issues
 - Track developments and address issue in national and state laws.
 - Protect the integrity of public records access by addressing public safety loopholes.
 - Implement mutual aid agreements.
 - Complete Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations—COG & COOP
3. Policy and Administration
 - Implement project planning methodology for homeland security.
 - Develop public safety training capacity.
 - Create a commitment to the 31 urban areas.
 - Improving case studies, communication and coordination.
 - Reassess support agency relationships.



Critical Mission Areas

INTELLIGENCE, WARNING AND COUNTER-TERRORISM:

Improving the way public safety agencies gather information and respond to information they receive.

DEVELOP A DAILY WATCH REPORT & WARNING SYSTEM

Ever since Governor Ridge asked citizens to be in a heightened-state of awareness there has been a call for developing a better bridge between what information we know about terrorism and how to respond to it.

By developing a daily watch report we get public safety agencies, from law enforcement, regulatory inspectors, fire and emergency responders and private citizens to give us information which can be passed up to the Department of Homeland Security Coordination Center. The Department can best review and analyze information that from our vantage point may not look significant, but from a national perspective may highlight trends in security breaches.

The state's warning system, presumably the blue-to-red system currently used by the Department of Homeland Security, can provide a state of awareness to Indiana citizens and institutions based on national findings. Development of proper responses is key to the effectiveness of the system, and law enforcement specialists (as described below) should work with local public safety

agencies in developing customized responses to the threat level system.

The state already has daily reports collected by the State Emergency Management Agency as well as law enforcement bulletins through the Indiana State Police. With these two entities combining their reporting along with other daily reports, some from local government, others from national agencies such as the National Infrastructure Protection Center's Daily Open Source Report, a thorough and timely watch report can be developed.

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE STATE'S BOMB TECHNICIANS

The state of Indiana has 11 FBI-certified bomb squads distributed throughout the state. **(Appendix 3).** The goal should not be to increase the amount, but rather to lend support to each bomb squad so they can improve their capacity and better serve each other and underrepresented areas of the state.

The manner in doing this is two-fold. First, the state should consider establishing an accounting mechanism by which it can distribute grant money, provided either by federal or state resources, to the bomb squads for equipment and training.

Second, the state should take the lead in writing a mutual aid agreement with the bomb squads so all areas of the state are adequately protected.

The state is already coordinating federal grant support to bomb technicians through U.S. Department of Justice Office of Domestic Preparedness grant funds. However, equipment and training is an on-going support function of bomb squads who can see their equipment either destroyed or worn down to the point where safety is compromised. Furthermore, advances in technology warrant deployment of proven safe equipment that can protect the citizens of Indiana.

By establishing an account, the state can assist local agencies with quantity purchase agreements and if possible, capitalize the account with funds to provide on-going support.

By initiating a mutual aid agreement among bomb squads, Indiana would merely formalize the relationship that already exists. But in an era when the public expects public safety agencies to be clear about their relationships and capabilities, it is important that the state's bomb squads clarify their response and coverage capabilities for uncovered areas and for each other in the event of multiple runs. By entering into a mutual aid agreement, areas that cannot afford a bomb squad can understand what their expectations are in supporting EOD units.

RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT THE KEY ROLE THE FBI AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PLAY IN HOMELAND SECURITY

Not only do public safety agencies need to collaborate horizontally among the disciplines of law enforcement and emergency management, but there needs to be vertical collaboration among federal, state and local agencies. The membership of C-TASC reflects this with the active participation of the U.S. Department of Justice, F.B.I. and U.S. Attorney's Office and conversely with C-TASC participation on U.S. D.O.J. homeland security task forces.

From the perspective of the state strategy, federal law enforcement agencies have a unique and vital role in preventing and prosecuting terrorism. The state's law enforcement agencies should serve the federal agencies by providing them with necessary resources and support to do their job. Admittedly, this is not an easy task for local and state agencies that may view the federal government's role with cynicism. But we must remind ourselves that the importance of our contribution is in our hands, and that local and state law enforcement is uniquely poised to make a contribution in three key ar-

eas, which are not exclusive, but only representative of the kind of information that needs to move between law enforcement agencies:


1. **Money Laundering Intelligence:** Cutting off the source of support for terrorism networks is necessary to strike-down and prevent terrorism. Most money laundering is found in smaller crimes that often come to the attention of local law enforcement. One stark example is the Hezbollah money-laundering scheme in North Carolina which was prosecuted in 2002. In that example, a local law enforcement officer working off-duty noticed suspicious smuggling of cigarettes that eventually led to the terrorist network in Detroit.
 - Law enforcement should refocus its reporting efforts to pass money laundering intelligence up to the federal agencies for further investigation.
2. **Identity Theft Intelligence:** Preventing the exploitation of identity theft is another method to prevent terrorists from hiding in our society. In addition, the need to protect the integrity of our identity systems in place warrant swift and effective enforcement against anyone trying to exploit those systems, whether they are drivers' licenses, false government papers or credit card and financial frauds.
 - State and local law enforcement should refocus its reporting efforts to pass identify theft intelligence up to federal agencies for further investigation.
3. **Develop Intelligence Unit Standard Operating Procedures:** There are only a handful of analytical intelligence officers in Indiana, and perhaps several others who engage in informal intelligence gathering work. Law enforcement agencies that gather intelligence of any sort should be encouraged to work together to develop a comprehensive standard operating procedure for the collection, filing, analysis and reporting of the information. One does not have to reach far back into the history of our country to identify abuses in intelligence gathering by domestic government agencies.
 - To safeguard the public and the public's liberties, it is beholden on us to actively pursue procedures that allow for the collection of data while protecting the public from abuses.

INVESTIGATE AND DEVELOP A UNIFIED CASE REPORTING SYSTEM

Indiana does not have a unified crime reporting system to collect and disseminate crime statistics. In order to develop such a system, a unified case report system would have to be created in which each law enforcement agency would agree on a standardized form for reporting incidents and investigations. Many agencies do not want such a system either to assure autonomy or to avoid the “hidden” costs of change. A similar effort was made a decade ago to no avail.

Law enforcement agencies should enter into a long-range reporting vision to start the process of merging critical public safety data. The implementation of CJIS is a good start (see *Technology*), and the vision can begin with taking CJIS to the next step. After that, larger law enforcement agencies should consider a unified intelligence system and plan on a unified case reporting system that could be useful to national and local law enforcement.

By starting on a long-term vision, law enforcement can start the critical budgeting and planning necessary to get there.





PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, KEY ASSETS AND EVENTS:

Working with the private sector, provide support to improve security at our state's facilities and community events.

DEVELOP AN EVENT & FACILITY SECURITY SPECIALTY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

Opportunities to train law enforcement for event and facility security are numerous. Besides military experience, which many law enforcement officers have, there are schools provided by the federal government (FBI, U.S. Marshall, Secret Service, ATF) and certifications by the private sector. In addition, many law enforcement officers have substantial experience in private sector protection either in working off-duty or in providing protection at community events.

C-TASC should develop a list of law enforcement officers who have enough training to warrant designation as an Event and Facility Security Specialist, listing their training and certifications. The list can be used to provide those specialists with additional opportunities for professional development. In addition, the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy should consider offering continuing education opportunities to these specialists so they can further develop their understanding of force protection.

These officers can be the local “go-to” people for local elected officials, industry and the community in general when it comes to answering questions about facility and critical infrastructure protection. There are countless opportunities for them to serve the community, but included in them are:

- Work with prosecutors and airports to address local security force protection at all 6 major Indiana airports so a seamless security force works with the Transportation Security Administration
- Integrate new court protection standards into any security outreach.
- Develop customized responses to the National Warning System
- Liaison with the School Safety Specialists and local Emergency Management Agency

CREATE A CRITICAL ASSET IDENTIFICATION & MONITORING SYSTEM

There are four known critical asset listings and perhaps countless others if one considers internal and ad hoc reports inventorying key community assets. The state should identify a gatekeeper for the information who can be responsible for collecting the information from a

variety of sources, synthesizing the data and inventorying the state's critical assets according to national guidelines on a GIS system.

The gatekeeper, presumably a state agency, must have adequate security. In addition, public access laws would have to address any barriers to information sharing that might prevent a candid discussion with the private sector. The information can be collected from a variety of resources, including emergency management agencies and county auditors, who through compliance with General Accounting Standards Board 34, must account for critical infrastructure in their jurisdiction.

By placing the system on a GIS system, another layer of analysis can be done by cross-referencing spatial relationships between critical infrastructures. This would allow modeling of disasters to see what kind of effect they would have on a community and to better assist the community in planning a response.

INDIANA'S SCHOOL SAFETY SPECIALIST ACADEMY: A MODEL WORTH REPEATING

The Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy, run by the Indiana Department of Education, provides on-going, certified training and information on national and state best practices, as well as exemplary resources on school safety, security, intervention, prevention, and emergency preparedness planning. The Academy is a model of how a sector can work hard, plan and train, to improve their security and safety. For the past three years, the Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy has successfully trained and certified representatives of public and non-public schools in providing safer educational environments for students in Indiana. Curriculum topics for the Academy include:

- National Overview of Best Practices of School Safety
- Legal Issues and Development of School Safety Policies
- School Environment and Security Operations Role of Exemplary School Safety Specialists
- Comprehensive Safe School Planning
- School and Community Collaboration
- Violence Prevention and Crisis Management

The Academy has grown over the past three years from serving over three hundred (300) Specialists to seven-hundred and fifty (750) Specialists.

PRESENT A CLEAR BUSINESS CASE FOR SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

One of the best ways to prepare for terrorism is to prepare for all risks. With eighty percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States in the hands of the private sector the well-being of our society is dependent on taking security seriously.

With hazardous materials, transportation capacity and energy supplies throughout the entire state, we should work with the insurance industry to develop crisis management and prevention capacity in the private sector. Working with business educators, national strategies and baseline skill sets should be identified and adopted.

- Train employees in awareness, access control and emergency drills
- Plan for disaster recovery and mitigation
- Collect and distribute national sector strategies
- Integrate efforts with property & casualty insurance industry, leveraging their expertise in risk assessment

C-TASC should work with the Indiana Department of Insurance, the state bar, and other associations who are stakeholders in incident management in providing training opportunities to the private sector.

FACILITY AND EVENT SECURITY ROUNDTABLE: FINDINGS

C-TASC convened a group of local, state and federal law enforcement officials to determine the best way to provide critical infrastructure support. The roundtable discussion decided that since every building and event is site specific, the best way to provide protection is to identify five key steps which must be taken to assure facility and event security.

- #1. Leadership must make a commitment to security.
- #2. There must be a plan to provide security for the facility or event.
- #3. All people involved in the security of the event or facility must be involved in developing the strategy.
- #4. The plan must be exercised, tested in the most realistic conditions, and revised with the after-action review of the exercise.
- #5. There must be a commitment to keeping the experiences gained from protecting the facility within the institution, by preventing employee turnover or using a mentoring system, and in sharing the experiences with other similarly-situated facilities and events.

ESTABLISH TASK FORCES FOR INTEGRATED SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY

The National Strategy for Homeland Security has identified 13 critical infrastructure sectors. This strategy proposes the creation of three standing task forces to address critical infrastructure protection needs for the transportation, agriculture and cyber-security sector and to provide recommendations to C-TASC for policy development.

Cyber-Security

The state can take the lead in developing a cyber-security task force by meeting with representatives of data processing industries, including finance and banking, and identifying a list of tasks that can improve security. Among these tasks are:

- a. Exchange a contact list of certified cyber security personnel*
- b. Promote private sector support for the FBI's Infraguard and Secret Service cybersecurity activities*
- c. Develop a web-presence for state-of-the-art information*
- d. Assist local governments and businesses with disaster recovery plans*

Transportation Security

As the crossroads of America, Indiana has airports, seaports, highway and rail systems, carrying passengers and cargo across the country. Protecting the passenger and cargo industries are vital to a robust and healthy economy. C-TASC should identify an agency who can bring together all key industry associations and transportation related officials who can identify tasks that can improve security. Among these tasks are:

- a. Identify intermodal links that warrant heightened security*
- b. Conduct an exercise in emergency response to a transportation-based incident*
- c. Develop cargo-integrity systems to prevent the exploitation of shipping as a means of delivering terrorist weapons*
- d. Inventory assets for the critical infrastructure asset monitoring system*
- e. Inventory equipment that can be used to assist in a catastrophic incident*

Agriculture Security

One of the most vigorous task forces to provide input to the state strategy was the agricultural security task force, which identified 11 action items. Besides continuing the work of the Task Force, the items they should be charged with completing include:

- a. Develop a flowchart of threats and re-*

sponses, identifying who is responsible for each threat area and what resources are available, including communication protocols

b. Provide educational programs for agriculturally-based businesses, employees and the public on the threats and concerns about an agricultural based terrorism event

c. Improve diagnostic facilities and develop protocols with private laboratories to increase capacity in the event of an emergency

d. Seek continued funding for the animal health bio-security and planning position in the Indian Board of Animal Health

e. Initiate a review of food safety regulations and administration to see whether the current agencies of Indiana State Department of Health, Commissioner of Agriculture, State Veterinarian and State Chemist can better organize their collateral authority over food safety.

National Strategy Sectors	Proposed Sector Task Forces	Other Forums or Responsible Party (not including private sector groups)
Agriculture	Agriculture Security	
Food	Agriculture Security	
Water	Agriculture Security	
Public Health		Bio-Terrorism Task Force
Emergency Services		LEPCs
Government		Law Enforcement Specialist
Defense Industrial Base		LEPCs
Information and Telecommunications	Cyber-Security	
Energy		LEPCs
Transportation	Transportation Security	
Banking and Finance	Cyber-Security	
Chemical Industry		LEPCs
Postal and Shipping	Transportation Security	



DEFENDING AGAINST CATASTROPHIC THREATS:

Protecting the health and welfare of the state's citizens is the foundation of the public health system, which must now be prepared to deal with biological, radioactive and nuclear incidents.

PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM EVENT

Security guards may be able to search packages for guns and bombs, but bio-terrorism weapons are microscopic. The spread of scientific knowledge and technologies to organizations and international terrorists who may wish to strike at western civilization warrants precautionary measures.

The best response to bio-terrorism is early detection and an informed public who understands that the overwhelming number of pathogens used in bio-terrorism have effective treatments or immunizations.

Although bio-terrorism has its limits as an effective weapon, the scenarios that could unfold warrant cautionary measures. These measures are best described as building baseline epidemiological capacity within the public health system. This way, outbreaks can be detected early and assessed for their danger to the general public; much like the public health system does every year with influenza or the occasional hepatitis outbreak.

The Indiana State Department of Health has been actively working on bio-terrorism preparedness over the last year as part of its approximately \$20.5 million grant from U.S. Health and Human Services. The grant has two portions, a bio-terrorism preparedness section and a hospital preparedness section. Both sections require the creation of multi-organization task forces to assist in the planning and implementation of the preparedness strategy.

The bio-terrorism plan fulfills the goal of having a dual use strategy: not only will the response capabilities help us in the fight against bio-terrorism, but it will also assist us in monitoring naturally occurring outbreaks. It is important that a long-range view of the public health system include a vision of its own capacity. While we may plan on bio-terrorism funding to support public health in the foreseeable future, C-TASC and the ISDH should push the boundaries of this future to plan ways to take advantage of this unique period. This vision should include an assessment of local health departments and their funding.

The grant is focused and delineates a well-rounded preparation to a bio-terrorism event. Accordingly, the state strategy repeats here the objective of the grant with explanations that enable the reader to understand the

scope of preparation. There are six focus groups for bio-terrorism planning (Groups A-C, E-G) and the Hospital Preparedness section is divided into two phases, I and II. Focus Group D, which addresses chemical weapon preparedness, was only funded in a few select sites throughout the country. SEMA's ODP Anti-Terrorism grants address most of the state's chemical weapons needs. For reference, LHDs are "local health departments."

MMRS CITIES

The Metropolitan Medical Response System program was originated in 1996 by a bill commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Dominici Act, with Indiana's Senator Dick Lugar as a key proponent of bio-terrorism preparedness. The primary focus of the MMRS program is to develop or enhance existing emergency preparedness systems to effectively manage a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident.

Today, there are over 120 cities participating in the MMRS program, including Indianapolis and Ft. Wayne. The goal is to coordinate the efforts of local law enforcement, fire, HAZMAT, EMS, hospital, public health and other personnel to improve response capabilities in the event of a terrorist attack.

Any city that receives the funding for MMRS designation and training has goals to accomplish. Those goals include:

- Integrate biological preparedness into the overall planning process
- Develop plans for mass prophylaxis of exposed and potentially exposed populations.
- Develop plans for mass patient care.
- Develop plans for mass fatality management.

By having two MMRS cities in the state, Indiana is well under way to assuring that a large portion of the population will be part of a coordinated response. At the local level, this not only means that communities will be capable of responding to WMD incidents, but they will also be more prepared for the more common hazardous materials incident, the possibility of a naturally occurring outbreak (e.g., pandemic influenza), and be in a position to share their experiences with other Indiana communities to make them stronger and more

prepared. The accomplishments that other cities can look to emulate in their own community include:

- Development of response plans unique for each city.
- Creating an integrated immediate response structure.
- Creating an additional local and regional support network.
- Bring together response systems of surrounding jurisdictions in the planning process.
- Integrate local mass casualty plans.
- Bring together and encourages city planning agencies to interact where they never interacted before.
- Encourage and initiate hospital NBC planning.
- Create an interface between primary care providers and the public health community.
- Encourage local healthcare providers to develop appropriate medical treatment protocols.

Focus Group A:

Preparedness planning and readiness assessment

1. Complete critical assessments of readiness
2. Develop plans with key partners to address identified needs
3. Provide for overall management of grant activities
4. Provide public health expertise to local health departments by placing ISDH staff in areas around the state (housed in LHDs as possible)
5. Provide for administrative controls and accountability
6. Provide for physical plant and support
7. Support Indiana Counter-Terrorism and Security Council activities related to improving public health preparedness and bioterrorism response
8. Strengthen Radiologic Health programs (training and lab equipment)
9. Planning for National Pharmaceutical Stockpile receipt and management

Focus Group B:

Surveillance and epidemiology capacity

1. Provide epidemiologic/disease surveillance support for local health departments by placing ISDH staff in areas around the state (housed in LHDs as possible)
2. Provide for epidemiologic/disease surveillance support and expertise to LHDs and field-placed ISDH staff
3. Provide for electronic capture, analysis, and presentation of communicable disease data
4. Provide for geographic information systems (GIS) analysis and presentation of disease data
5. Provide Internet-based reporting of communicable disease data from private laboratories
6. Develop syndromic surveillance system based on emergency department data for early detection of communicable disease outbreak or bio-terrorism action
7. Strengthen food protection activities and information systems

Focus Group C:

Laboratory capacity, biological agents

Provide for enhanced laboratory analysis with updated laboratory testing equipment

2. Establish formal laboratory coordination among private and public health labs to assure timely, accurate identification of disease agents
3. Improve laboratory practices for accuracy, timeliness, data reporting, and safety
4. Increase staffing

Focus Group D:

Chemical agents not funded

Focus Group E:

Health alert network and I.T.

1. Assess communications capacity needs with local health departments, hospitals, laboratories, and local EMS providers
2. Provide high-speed, secure Internet connectivity to all local health departments
3. Develop redundant communications capabilities with LHDs, hospitals, and local EMS providers
4. Upgrade LHD computer infrastructure

5. Provide up-to-date directory of LHD, hospital, EMS, and other staff with roles in addressing a disease outbreak or bio-terrorism attack

Focus Group F:

Risk communication and health information

1. Assess current communication and information needs and methods
2. Maintain accurate contact lists for key public health stakeholders
3. Develop and distribute media relation kits to support timely, accurate release of news reports
4. Provide for public communication support and expertise to LHDs with ISDH communications expertise in the field

Focus Group G:

Education and Training

1. Assess LHD and ISDH staff training needs
2. Develop and offer training to update public health staff capabilities
3. Provide for distance learning resources to LHDs and other local partners
4. Support training of new public health professionals

Hospital Preparedness

Phase 1: Needs Assessment, Planning and Initial Implementation

1. Assess current hospital preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks and bio-terrorism events
2. Increase hospitals' ability to handle a surge of infected or injured patients
3. Provide for access to pharmaceuticals and supplies necessary to address a disease outbreak or act of bio-terrorism

Phase 2, which involves the implementation to upgrade facilities, and a multi-tiered system to triage, isolate, stabilize and refer multiple casualties, is to be funded and addressed in the next years' CDC/HRCA grant.

PREPARE THE NATIONAL GUARD FOR HOMELAND SECURITY MOBILIZATION

The Military Department of Indiana is uniquely positioned to assist Indiana in any mass catastrophe. To prepare for such a contingency, the Guard should have training for battalions in civil support and work with ISDH on National Pharmaceutical Stockpile distribution.

The MDI/National Guard were deployed shortly after 9/11 to provide force protection oversight to Indiana's six major airports. The deployment taught us that the National Guard has three issues that must be weighed whenever they are considered for homeland security.

First, deployment of a national guard soldier is often taking them away from their regular employment duties, which often includes positions of public safety. Second, that the guard in federal status has posse comitatus restrictions that prohibit them from acting in a law enforcement capacity. Finally, that the Indiana National Guard's role as a leader in active service means that the state must have contingencies for the event the National Guard is deployed overseas and cannot assist with homeland security tasks at home.

With these issues in mind, the National Guard could be called the original homeland security organization. With its military discipline, equipment and expertise in force protection, the National Guard is a priceless asset that warrants strategic use in the state's strategy.

The National Guard can best assist the state by being prepared for deployment in the event of a catastrophe. To achieve this objective, the National Guard should train three battalions on a rotating schedule to provide civil support to a terrorism related event. The battalions should be trained in a variety of tactics, including crowd management, bomb sweeps, critical infrastructure protection, casualty transportation and other support functions.

Furthermore, the National Guard should integrate itself into other strategies as necessary to assist in their completion. Perhaps the most important of these is the deployment of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, the emergency medication provided by CDC in the event of a bio-terrorism event or medical catastrophe.

DEVELOP ROBUST AGRO-SECURITY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES

As referenced in the section on critical infrastructure protection, the state needs to vigorously protect its agricultural assets, whether it be plant, animal or food processing. Besides the formation of the task force and implementation of its strategic plan, as summarized above, the state needs to maintain a capable response to agricultural issues.

In the wake of Great Britain's epic struggle with foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), the reality of such a devastating situation hit home in October 2001 when the Indiana State Board of Animal Health (BOAH) conducted a mock animal health disaster.

The emergency exercise brought together key staffers from more than a dozen public and private organizations to battle a make-believe disease similar to FMD. The drill played out a simulated foreign animal disease outbreak on farms in Carroll County and Elkhart County to test Indiana's preparedness and ability to respond to a large-scale disaster.

BOAH has had a written veterinary response plan for a foreign animal disease outbreak for several years. However, not until this event was BOAH's plan incorporated into Indiana's master disaster management and response plan. Today, if a widescale livestock disease event occurred, the state of Indiana would respond with resources and personnel similar to a flood or tornado emergency.

Adding animal health issues to the state's plan creates an opportunity for many state and federal agencies, animal industry leaders and commodity groups to become more aware of the roles their organizations would play if a catastrophic disease event occurred.

While the mock disaster drill validated many strengths of the new animal health plan, the exercise did reveal areas in need of improvement. Indiana needs to improve its ability to identify all the impacted livestock sites quickly and efficiently. Compiling necessary information and identifying every producer who needs to be notified could take days or even weeks. Speed is a critical factor in our ability to respond quickly and efficiently to contain a serious disease break.

The other missing piece, revealed in the exercise, is the lack of detailed information about federal compensation programs for livestock owners whose animals and/or property may be condemned, as well as assistance programs for lost production and productivity in animal-related businesses.

While the United States has had no case of FMD since 1929, the disease has been active in Europe and South America in recent years. FMD is a highly contagious virus that infects cloven-hoofed animals, including cattle, swine and sheep, although the virus has no human health effects. By being prepared for FMD, Indiana should be well-prepared for other less volatile pathogens and natural outbreaks.



EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE:

Coordinating support and assistance to a terrorism event is similar to the same support given in any disaster. Building the capacity to respond to “all-hazards” will equip us with the tools necessary to mitigate any act of terrorism.

COMPLETE BASELINE STANDARDS FOR AN ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Emergency preparedness, like public health preparedness for bio-terrorism, is an excellent example of the dual-use of the strategy’s goals. The fundamental emergency preparedness disciplines that are used to respond to a terrorism incident are the same that would respond to a natural disaster or an accident involving a hazardous material.

C-TASC and SEMA should remain committed to building state and local emergency response capacity by focusing on two key areas: a systematic local and state incident command training effort and reaching consistent minimum EMA standards throughout the state.

Adequate emergency response requires incident command training on the part of all local and state emergency responders, including law enforcement and fire fighters. The training helps build teamwork and identifies other issues important to adequately address crisis

situations and minimize the risk. C-TASC, SEMA and other stakeholders should identify an incident command protocol and vigorously train their employees and local agencies on the protocol.

The state should also examine emergency operation centers (EOC) in other states and consider relocating the current EOC to a larger and more robust facility. The state currently plans to develop communication centers for the Indiana Department of Transportation and SAFE-T (described below). C-TASC and SEMA should put plans in motion to take advantage of the funding and development to see whether the public would be better served by a larger and more advanced EOC.

With 92 separate emergency management agencies, the state should use its funding mechanisms to achieve minimum performance standards, including equipment, comprehensive emergency management plans and standard operating procedures.

Imposing performance obligations on EMAs as a condition of funding is expected. Every level of government that grants funds should attach performance obligations to those grant funds.

But the state would be short-sighted if, like the public health system, it didn't take a critical look at the capacity for emergency management agencies and consider ways of supporting local emergency management. The emergency management agencies are very similar to the public health agencies in that they are both county-government organizations.

The problem to overcome is the fiscal decision of many locally-elected officials to forego emergency planning capacity. It is said that risk is reinforcing – every day one goes by without an incident is a day the right decision was made. Unfortunately, all it takes is one catastrophic incident to spend all the capital saved by not investing in any emergency management capacity.

Currently, the state has 36 full-time, 49 part-time and 7 volunteer emergency management agencies (**Appendix 4**). The presumptive cost of a full-time emergency management director is \$50,000 a year, salary, fringe benefits and expenses included. C-TASC and SEMA should develop a way for local governments to phase in local emergency management agencies so they are capable of handling, responding and storing the equipment and plans necessary to have a modern emergency management agency. For example, \$350,000 would take the seven volunteer emergency management agencies to part-time, and some of the part-time counties are in areas with enough hazardous materials and a population to warrant full-time status. Knowing how much money and where we need to focus our capacity will help us identify funding opportunities and sources.

PURDUE HOMELAND SECURITY INSTITUTE

Earlier this year Purdue University created a Homeland Security Institute to develop science and technologies in homeland security. Purdue based its plan on the six critical mission areas and four foundations of the National Strategy. Two areas that Purdue has already given an edge to Indiana in homeland security is in development of the Measured Response computer simulation and in the Southwest Indiana Disaster Resistant Community Initiative.

SOUTHWEST INDIANA DISASTER RESISTANT COMMUNITY INITIATIVE

The Southwest Indiana Disaster Resistant Community Corporation (SWIDRCC), a collection of emergency management agencies in southwest Indiana, has partnered with Sandia National Labs and the Homeland Security Institute to bring together the best technological, engineering and scientific resources in a prototype Disaster Management System (DMS).

If deployed, the DMS would utilize sensors on infrastructure including buildings, roads, bridges, and utility lifelines. Real time data would be telemetered to a local and remote source via satellite for analysis. Model scenarios could also be interjected for planning purposes. This system would allow responders to either model an action and or evaluate the infrastructure in a very short time frame and determine what method of response was most effective. This system is also designed to include "soft" factors such as environmental impacts, social and economic issues in the community.

Another unique feature of this proposal is its scalability. The DMS is designed so that it can be utilized by a single industrial or office complex, a group of remotely located public buildings, a military installation, an entire city or county, a region, or state.

Finally, this system is designed to be cost beneficial, as it is used on a daily basis for routine operations such as data and geo-based mapping, operations monitoring, and maintenance scheduling for infrastructure and similar uses. By utilizing its many modeling features, a maintenance and retrofit cost-benefit analysis can be performed prior to major capital outlays. This factor helps provide sustainability for the system.

PARTICIPATE IN CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL PLANNING & TRAINING

On 9/11, it became clear that the catastrophic events of terrorism disregard our jurisdictional boundaries. The Pentagon saw at least three jurisdictions converge on the scene, and likewise, New York City also had emergency operations involving multiple states. The cross-roads of America borders four states, of which we share close urban sprawl with three: Cincinnati, Louisville and Chicago.

Indiana is a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, as are all the adjacent states. The local emergency management agencies in urban areas should be encouraged and given assistance in developing cross-jurisdictional planning capacity. While most emergency management agencies already do this as the state develops new terrorism strategies, particularly in the area of hospital planning and bio-terrorism preparedness, consideration of another state's plans is paramount.

The state should look for opportunities to engage in cross-border exercises, whether they are tabletop or full-scale National Guard battalion exercises. Such exercises require advance planning and a complex funding relationship. The state should look to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for assistance and guidance in completing these exercises.

MEASURED RESPONSE: PUTTING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS TO THE TEST

Measured Response simulations are based on traditional military style war-gaming and enable the participants to see the consequences of their decisions and actions in real time.

Measured Response simulates the consequences of a bio-terrorist attack scenario in a mid-western city during a fictitious major spectator event. Several hundred thousand artificial agents mimic the behavior of the citizens of the U.S. and dozens of human players make decisions representing various government agencies at the local, state, and federal levels such as the Office of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, CDC, FBI, DoD, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard. It also includes citizens' interest groups, such as the Red Cross, along with private sector entities such as pharmaceutical companies.

The main objectives are to manage the public mood, maintain public health, mitigate the risk of contagion, maintain orderly movement of traffic and people, and apprehend perpetrators. Players can affect the transmission rates through different interventions such as quarantine, vaccination, treatment, and isolation. The program also models the public's feeling of well-being in terms of security (financial and physical), health, information, mobility, and civil liberties.

By using the power of a computer simulation, players can review their responses in a cost-efficient

manner and experiment with a number of different responses, allowing all agencies and players to become better prepared for a bio-terrorism event.

The National Science Foundation and 21st Century Research and Technology Fund of the State of Indiana have funded this research.

PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Hoosiers are eager to assist their communities and provide support in times of crisis and need. The USA Freedom Corps has five opportunities for citizens to participate: citizens corps councils, neighborhood watch, volunteers in policing, medical reserve corps and the community emergency response team (CERT). The coordinating body for these efforts, the Governor's Commission on Volunteerism has adopted C-TASC as its coordinating body for these efforts and C-TASC will focus on those efforts it can add value to – the citizens corps councils, medical reserve corps and CERTs.

These efforts are all local councils. At the time this report was put together, Indiana already had 12 citizens corps councils.

Indianapolis : Indiana State Citizen Corps Council

Auburn : Citizens Corps of Northeast Indiana

Bloomington : Monroe County Citizen Corps Council

Danville : Hendricks County Citizen Corps Council

Evansville : Southwest Indiana Disaster Resistant Community Corp. Inc.

Evansville : Evansville-Vanderburgh Co. Emergency Management Agency Advisory Council

Fort Wayne : Citizen Corps of Allen County, Indiana

Lafayette : Tippecanoe County Emergency Management Volunteer Agency

Michigan City : [NAC] Neighbors Against Crime - Neighborhood Watch

Ogden Dunes : Ogden Dunes Volunteer Fire Department

South Bend : Citizen Corps. of St. Joseph County, IN

Valparaiso : Porter County Citizens Response Team

Valparaiso : Students Emergency Response Team

The Medical Reserve Corps is also a locally-driven council. The Medical Reserve Corps is an excellent standing organization to identify and train licensed health care professionals who can assist the state and local health departments in a time of a crisis. C-TASC should work with ISDH and the Health Professions Bureau in facilitating the Medical Reserve Corps.

There are three general types of organizations who are stakeholders in Medical Reserve Corps, local health departments, hospitals, and specialized health care organizations. Any one of the three can start a Medical Reserve Corps unit. Each corps unit should have two primary tasks. First, to collect emergency contact information, including areas of expertise. Second, to provide training to the participants, either as continuing medical education credits, general bio-terrorism awareness, or volunteer opportunities in the community that will build necessary clinical skills.

The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program helps train people to be better prepared to respond to emergency situations in their communities. CERT members give critical support to first responders in emergencies, provide immediate assistance to victims, organize spontaneous volunteers at a disaster site, and collect disaster intelligence to support first responder efforts.

The CERT course is taught in the community by a trained team of first responders who have completed a CERT Train-the-Trainer course conducted by their state training office for emergency management, or FEMA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI), located in Emmitsburg, Maryland. CERT training includes disaster preparedness, disaster fire suppression, basic disaster medical operations, and light search and rescue operations.

Indiana has received federal funding from FEMA to support citizens corps councils and CERT teams. C-TASC should assist SEMA in identifying other funding opportunities to support these efforts and to give Indiana's citizens more opportunities to help others.

cal volunteer support entities, the citizens corps councils have the flexibility to reflect the priorities of the local area. They can support volunteer efforts through Red Cross certification, assist the Local Emergency Planning Councils (LEPCs), help develop adequate warning system protocols, or develop their own interests and expertise.

EXPAND LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEES

Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC), with membership including major industry and local officials, are an excellent platform to expand emergency preparedness. LEPCs should help develop Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of Operations (COOP) capacity for government and industry, conduct vulnerability assessments, exchange information with regulatory agencies and develop economic recovery strategies in the event of a catastrophic event.

While the state may inventory critical assets, vulnerability assessments which view site plans are best conducted and maintained at the source. LEPCs can provide technical assistance in either obtaining vulnerability assessment templates or they can maintain a list of vendors who can perform the work. Any vulnerability assessments collected by the LEPC should not be subject to open records law, which may require an amendment to the public records statute.

LEPCs can also be the conduit for security information from regulatory agencies that affect the safety of Indiana's industry. LEPCs can become another source for Indiana's Department of Transportation, Port Authority, Department of Environmental Management, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and motor carrier enforcement to distribute their information.

LEPCs can also become the forum to plan mitigation and economic recovery strategies from terrorism and catastrophic events, perhaps by involving local mental health advocates and partnering with the Department of Workforce Development. The best advocates for continuity of government, continuity of operations and economic impact statements for business and government accidents can be the LEPCs, which already have business partnerships and experience with handling hazardous situations.

Any effective strategy starts with a champion - stakeholders who articulate a clear message for preparedness. While C-TASC and its members may hold that position in state government there needs to be local leadership that provides the message. Emergency Management Agencies are ideal for developing the message and all EMAs have access to an LEPC. Because LEPCs obtain information critical to a community's safety and provides a public-private forum for planning, we are best served by using this existing organization and assisting it in its advocacy.

C-TASC should propose town-hall style meetings with LEPCs on a regional basis to develop goals and strategies and hear from them what tasks should be accomplished. Although those provided here stem from input at the Summit and different task forces, local LEPCs should be encouraged to consider other goals and strategies which serve the needs of their communities.





FOUNDATION

TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES

INDIANA MAP CRISIS AND RESPONSE CENTER

C-TASC received a generous donation of GIS software from ESRI that will help us develop a statewide geographic information system for preparedness, response and recovery. GIS is an essential element in planning, analyzing and supporting the decisions of local responders. As demonstrated by the Indianapolis IMAGIS during the fall tornado in 2002. The Center will initiate a locally-based, distributed GIS program of mutual support to county emergency operation centers; facilitate local, state and federal response to human and natural disasters; and establish a foundation to support field operations and public information.

INDIANA MAP: INTEGRATED STATEWIDE GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Information management is critical for homeland security, and few applications are as important as a robust GIS system. Mapping can be used for emergency response planning and modeling, as well as recovery. Law enforcement can use it for mapping trends, thereby improving performance, and public health agencies can use it for syndromic surveillance. And because these

agencies can share the base map with other local agencies, the GIS systems can be used for other applications as well.

There are two avenues for the state to pursue – developing its own statewide mapping system and assisting local governments in adopting a GIS standard that can be shared with other entities. Which would result in building an Indiana map from the top down and the bottom up.

For a statewide map, INDOT is already investing considerable resources into a GIS map that can be shared with other state entities in the performance of their duties. Such sharing should continue and be accelerated if possible. Whichever agency takes responsibility for mapping the critical infrastructure will in large part be utilizing this same mapping system.

The Indiana GIS Council is a not-for-profit entity that has received recognition from the State of Indiana for its goal to unify local GIS systems as part of the national map effort of the United States Geological Survey. To date there are approximately 40 counties that use GIS in one form or another. The Council's efforts are key to putting tools into the right hands.

Local emergency management and health departments can use the maps for modeling and planning, and these same maps can be shared with other departments who could use the GIS system for their own missions, regardless of the impact on homeland security. The Indiana GIS Council's efforts embody the key principles of dual-use, integration and national standards.

C-TASC should work with the GIS Council on identifying the counties who are in a position to launch their GIS systems into a fully integrated county-wide system. By focusing on these counties, we will be investing in counties who have already made a commitment to GIS and who can sustain the effort necessary to maintain the mapping system. In addition, it will provide a laboratory for other counties to see how GIS is used in improving local government services and hopefully accelerate the development of GIS in the other 52 counties.

State agencies should embrace the approach of the Indiana GIS Council and assist their local counterparts in developing local, integrated GIS systems on the same system. Besides working with their own GIS systems, state agencies can also integrate with their local counterparts (e.g. economic development to economic development, transportation to transportation). In this manner, the web-like system can be built across state agencies, across county governments, and in-between state and county departments.

SAFETY ACTING FOR EVERYONE TOGETHER: SAFE-T

When response teams from Washington D.C., Alexandria, Virginia and Maryland responded to the Pentagon, none of their communication systems were integrated. Incident command and a successful response require integrated communications. SAFE-T embodies all the principles of homeland security, dual-use, integration and national standards in its goal to provide a state-wide integrated communication system.

Project Hoosier SAFE-T is a statewide 800 megahertz digital radio communication network that has been designed for use by federal, state and local public safety agencies:

- a 800 MHz mobile data communications solutions supports computer equipped vehicles with digital reliability;
- with 95% mobile radio coverage, and reliable portable coverage; and

- if desired, local agencies may incorporate enhancements at their cost to provide better in-building coverage. Also, there are hardware enhancements for dispatchers and commanders and other public service users.

Installation of network hardware will begin this spring in Northern Indiana. Statewide installation should be completed by 2006.

Participation in Project Hoosier SAFE-T is voluntary for all local agencies and can generate significant savings. Installation and maintenance of system infrastructure is the most expensive portion of any communication network. However, the SAFE-T network can provide a significant cost savings for cash-strapped local jurisdictions.

Project Hoosier SAFE-T has committed to provide the statewide network infrastructure with no monthly or annual fees, so agencies only need to provide less expensive user equipment for dispatchers and front-line users.

Project Hoosier SAFE-T also provides significant operational advantages to police, fire and other public safety agencies, including:

- Enhanced tactical capability to apprehend criminals faster and more efficiently;
- Better coordination at catastrophic events where assistance is needed from other jurisdictions;
- Improved chances of saving lives during emergencies.

The state should continue to fund SAFE-T and expedite its use as thoroughly as possible through incentives and technical assistance. C-TASC should work with the Integrated Public Safety Commission (IPSC) and the IPSC staff to identify funding resources and to encourage police, fire and other public safety agencies throughout the state to join the network.

The values of SAFE-T - interoperability, integration and national standards - are strong enough to warrant funding prohibitions. Particularly against other communication systems in the state requesting homeland security funds.

INDIANA EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK: INERN

Indiana has been selected as one of four sites to hold a forum in association with the Office of Homeland Security on information sharing I.T. systems. The intention of the forum is to bring a representative group of public safety officials together to facilitate improving information sharing.

The Dallas F.B.I. office has implemented the Dallas Emergency Response Network (Dallas ERN), a web-based information management system that allows the public to report incidents and allows for user groups to communicate critical information in a timely fashion. C-TASC should work with the Office of Homeland Security in presenting this system as an example of a solution-driven software and encourage Indiana's public safety agencies to engage in a deployment.


Indiana already has three similar systems, the Southwest Indiana Disaster Resistant Community Initiative and the Crane-based Homeland Security Communications Management System (HSCMS) explosive device pilot project which are highlighted. In addition, Indiana's Homeland Security Web-Image Network (available on the C-TASC website at www.in.gov/c-tasc), that allows for a threat level icon to be updated whenever a linked webpage is refreshed, is poised to start broadcasting public safety information. Furthermore, Indiana has also set up protocols for an Amber alert system that can provide information to the public.

Seemingly, the technologies and opportunities for communication are growing at a rate that exceeds the ability for us to change our institutional biases against exchanging information. The forum will identify these barriers and opportunities, and C-TASC should work with the host of the forum, the Purdue Homeland Security Institute, in expediting deployment and distribution of intelligence and critical information between state and law enforcement agencies.

HOMELAND SECURITY COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (HSCMS):

In the beginning of 2002 Crane and C-TASC started development of a web-based file management system that would allow incident reporting, database management and emergency notification.

As a result of meetings and interviews in 2003, Crane and C-TASC intend to launch a pilot HSCMS project that will enable the state's bomb technicians to file EOD reports on-line. The development of "business rules" will allow the sharing of the reports with predetermined parties who would have an interest in particular types of reports. Figure 1 shows that a report sent into the system can be distributed to all or any combination of agencies, depending on the nature of the report and the distribution agreements set up in advance. Over the course of developing the HSCMS pilot, it was found that the HSCMS could be adopted by the entire OHS / DHS Community, while adding value to the national effort to improve information integration and complementing many of the "solutions" being proposed for the various related activities by all concerned.



No special software would have to be loaded on any computer to achieve full operating capability. It has been recognized that the problem of effective terrorist threat incident reporting and case management is not just a problem for an information technology solution. The larger problem will be the cultural change required for all of the various agencies and personnel to work together to meet the goals and objectives for homeland security.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS: CJIS

The events of September 11, 2001 reinforced the importance of the foundation that has been built over the past eight years. They reemphasized the need to enhance an integrated statewide network that serves the needs of law enforcement and public safety officials. In coordination with Governor Frank O'Bannon's Counter Terrorism and Security Council (C-TASC), Livescan units were installed at Indianapolis International Airport in January 2002 to facilitate federal background checks for airport employees and the booking of criminal suspects.

The accurate, complete and timely submission and retrieval of arrest and disposition data is the cornerstone for all criminal justice information. There are 31 counties submitting all fingerprint/arrest data electronically via Livescans and over 80 counties submitting disposition information via the Proslink case management system. In 2002, Indiana continued its efforts to implement systems that facilitate the electronic submission of fingerprint arrest and disposition data. As of December 2002, 75% of all arrests and 80% of dispositions in Indiana are submitted electronically to the state's central records repository.

What does this mean? These technologies allow law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts to immediately identify suspects. This process used to take weeks or months. Furthermore, in February 2002 the Indiana State Police fingerprint repository, the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), was linked to the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) to allow state and local agencies to search the 40 million plus fingerprint records in a matter of hours. This direct linkage and integration with local departments is even more critical since the events of 9/11, which clearly demonstrate that access to complete criminal records is essential in identifying suspects.

Give him what he deserves — an accurate criminal record.

Terrorists, drunk drivers, sex offenders. What's one thing many of them have in common? An incomplete or non-existing criminal record, because their arrest information was never sent in after booking. Law enforcement officers need accurate records to know exactly who they're dealing with when they confront a subject. It could make the difference between a routine traffic stop and a dangerous situation.







During each booking, remember to:

1. Use the current State of Indiana criminal arrest card. If you don't have the current card, call (317) 452-5909.
2. Carefully and correctly print all subject's information. (Incomplete or illegible arrest cards may impede record processing.)
3. Regardless of how many times you've booked the subject before, process all Fingers and Class A misdemeanors, including traffic offenses (e.g. 302).
4. Take prints in proper sequential order and in the proper space on the card.
5. When printing with a live scan, do not use a previous booking. Start a new booking with each arrest.
6. Each day, send copies of all arrest cards (not the originals) to your prosecutor's office.
7. Immediately submit all original arrest cards—

by live scan unit to:
ISP Central Records Division
or by mail to:
Indiana Central Repository
100 N. Senate Ave., Room 8F08
Indianapolis, IN 46204-5259

Follow-through and give them the accurate criminal records they deserve—the safety of our officers depends on it! Questions? Call (317) 232-5909. 



LEGAL & SOCIAL ISSUES

TRACK DEVELOPMENTS AND ADDRESS ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND STATE LAW

The National Strategy asks each state to review its laws and legal issues to develop better practices and close loopholes that may be exploited in an emergency. Indiana should continue to review its laws and the model acts that become available. In addition, Indiana should participate in the development of model acts between states.

There are two model acts that are in the process of development: one for public health emergency powers, the other for drivers' license standards on accommodation to non-resident drivers. Discussions are underway for other model acts that might address many public safety issues, including development of mutual aid agreements and the sharing of criminal justice information. C-TASC should work with the respective agencies and the Attorney General's Office to track, review and critique model legislation so an informed decision can be made by the legislature on adoption of the model code.

Another area of legal development that warrants tracking and analysis is the emergency powers of the government in the event of a catastrophic incident. Besides the Model Emergency Public Health Powers Act, there are other issues that need review, including the regulatory framework that governs food safety, medical licensing

restrictions and indemnification for quarantining plants and animals. There are also changes to the regulatory framework in a number of areas involving water safety that warrant tracking and analysis.

PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF PUBLIC RECORDS ACCESS BY ADDRESSING PUBLIC SAFETY LOOPHOLES

The government contains thousands of records with information that any terrorist can exploit for harm and any citizen can use to make meaningful decisions for the safety of the community. The state should take its role as custodian of public information seriously and adopt a tiered approach to maintaining and distributing information, including timely evaluations of information within its possession and eliminating anonymous requests for information.

In addition, the state should amend the public access law to facilitate the sharing of vulnerability and threat assessments by the private sector by protecting that information from public disclosure (unless it is already provided under another regulatory scheme), protect emergency contact information for citizens participating in emergency response programs, and eliminate the ability of anonymous requests for information.

In addition, the GIS implementation referenced above needs adequate protection so sensitive datalayers, such as utility distribution systems are not readily available to anyone on the internet.

IMPLEMENT MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS

Indiana is a signatory to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a nationwide agreement for how states will assist each other in interstate emergency responses. In Indiana, with 92 counties and hundreds of local fire, police and emergency response organizations, there is no one agreement. The State of Indiana, through SEMA, should implement a mutual aid compact that will create a clear, consistent and sustainable response capability.

Implementation of such an agreement will be difficult, so Indiana should also follow the lead of other states and adopt a statewide mutual aid agreement with an opt-out provision that can be used by any local jurisdiction that does not want to participate. However, Indiana, while recognizing the autonomy of local jurisdictions, should consider withholding any state and federal public safety funds from any local jurisdiction that opts out of the mutual aid agreement. C-TASC, SEMA and others may weigh other alternatives to withholding money, but those agencies who are prepared to assist other in mutual aid should be given credit for their participation.

COMPLETE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT & CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS: COG & COOP

Maintaining continuity of government and of operations in the event of a catastrophic attack is necessary to protect our citizens and to maintain the rule of law. While the LEPCs are encouraged to assist in the COGS and COOPS for local government and businesses, C-TASC and SEMA should direct all state agencies to cooperate in the planning. This is necessary for SEMA and the Department of Administration to maintain state level continuity.

The National Strategy identifies continuity of the judiciary as a responsibility for the states. At this time FEMA is funding COGS and COOPS planning for state government in a format that will not only address continuity of the judiciary, executive, legislative and key administrative branches, but will also provide a template for local governments to use in their planning.

In addition, as referenced above, C-TASC, LEPCs and business preparedness forums should stress continuity of business, COOPS and recovery strategies to the private sector. Preparation includes:

- Designating the lines of succession and delegating authority of the successors;
- Establishing provisions for the relocation of essential departments, records, essential personnel, equipment and supplies;
- Recovery of essential support systems and technology; and
- Resumption of critical business functions

By taking the economic damage out of terrorism, we provide one less motive to terrorists and brace ourselves for mitigating its harm to property and the economy.



POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

INDIANA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION BEST PRACTICES ACADEMY ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND BIO-TERRORISM

Indiana was one of eight states selected for the National Governor's Association Best Practices Academy which runs from May of 2002 until May of 2003. The intention of the Academy is to get states to focus on a best practice strategy that can be shared with other states. In addition, the National Governor's Association provides access to experts in the area of emergency response, bio-terrorism and intergovernmental operations.

Indiana's best practice is implementation of an enterprise wide project planning software that will enable all C-TASC members and their agency's homeland security employees to plan, chart and track all projects related to homeland security. By implementing an enterprise wide solution, each agency can cross-reference other activities in other agencies, share resources and documents and coordinate deadlines. All of this information is trans-

parent to C-TASC members who can watch progress, or identify barriers.

The intention of the enterprise wide software (Microsoft Project 2002) is to create an agency within an agency approach. With strained resources, public safety agencies with established track records, relationships and funding streams are better able to serve the public by improving performance and accountability before expanding operations.

The other states that participate in the academy are Georgia, Ohio, Iowa, Utah, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands.

IMPLEMENT PROJECT PLANNING METHODOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Breaking down the institutional barriers of key security and emergency response agencies is vital to homeland security. While the national government has created a Department of Homeland Security, the State can effectively implement reporting and planning systems, specifically project planning software, to coordinate and implement this strategy.

The implementation of enterprise project planning software for all homeland security initiatives, allowing agencies to share resources, critical paths, deadlines and documents, can be the tool that helps us achieve this goal. This process will help identify agencies for the implementation of most if not all of the strategies (Appendix 5).

Tools are no good, however, if we aren't skilled in how to use them. C-TASC should integrate a full-time project manager into its staff, someone who can assist agencies in identifying and tracking their accomplishments in a way that will provide accountability and reward for prompt implementation of homeland security initiatives. C-TASC agencies such as SEMA, ISP, MDI, ISDH, and CJI should all continue appointing project management liaisons. In addition, C-TASC should impose project management tracking on its own initiatives as well as facilitate the same with other initiatives that might be housed with other agencies.

DEVELOP PUBLIC SAFETY TRAINING CAPACITY

The amount of training undertaken by first responders in terms of tax dollars and time commitment is not known. C-TASC should take a leadership position in establishing sound public policy positions on training by analyzing and proposing effective changes in training and certification for all emergency response disciplines. To do this, it is proposed that C-TASC develop the capacity to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of training programs and to improve the curriculum by looking to the next generation of instructional design.

First, C-TASC would evaluate and plan for an integrated public safety training program for the state, with the goal of shifting resources for a training program that the state can look to achieve in the next 10 years.

We can also evaluate and plan for an integrated public safety training program for local government as well, taking a global view and advising the state budget agency and legislative services on public safety training initiatives so the legislature can make an informed decision.

The second initiative to implement advance training methodology takes advantage of many of the online instructional methods now used at the university level. By integrating this approach with the state's goal of e-government, we can leverage our investment in technologies by serving public safety as well.

CREATE A COMMITMENT TO THE 31 URBAN AREAS

Emergency management, Sheriff's and public health agencies are all county-wide offices and the funding relationships between the state agencies and their county-based counterparts should be respected and preserved. However, it is important to recognize that 31 cities in Indiana with a population over 25,000 make up almost 40% of the state's population. Furthermore, the concentration of people and industry provides an environment that can result in catastrophic consequences if adequate homeland security initiatives are not taken.

The distribution of population and municipal entities is not regimented and the state's funding of homeland security should be flexible in addressing these local variations. As the state distributes funding from federal initiatives, it should use reporting and distribution requirements to make sure city organizations, emergency, fire and police agencies are also served.

Population Estimates for Cities over 25,000 in Population Indiana, 2001

CITY	POPULATION
Anderson	59,734
Bloomington	69,291
Carmel	37,733
Columbus	39,059
East Chicago	32,414
Elkhart	51,874
Evansville	121,582
Fishers	37,835
Fort Wayne	205,727
Gary	102,746
Goshen	29,383
Greenwood	36,037
Hammond	83,048
Hobart	25,363
Indianapolis	781,870
Jeffersonville	27,362
Kokomo	46,113
Lafayette	56,397
Marion	31,320
Merrillville	30,560
Michigan City	32,900
Mishawaka	46,557
Muncie	67,430
New Albany	37,603
Noblesville	28,590
Portage	33,496
Richmond	39,124
South Bend	107,789
Terre Haute	59,614
Valparaiso	27,428
West Lafayette	28,778
Total of Large Cities	2,414,757

POPULATION SUB-TOTALS

Total of Large Cities	2,414,757
Balance of State	3,665,728
Total Indiana	6,080,485

Source: 2001 U.S. Bureau of Census estimates.

C-TASC: IMPROVING CASE STUDIES, COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION

The role of C-TASC should continue to be to improve communication and coordination between state and local agencies, particularly in the area of project management. It should also look to developing instructional material and case studies for the private sector in improving their security response capabilities.

There are four main audiences which C-TASC should strive to reach. The first three are the legislature, the media and the business community. The legislature sets public policy through laws and oversight, and in providing them with information to make an informed decision, C-TASC should work with its member agencies to present a clear and consistent understanding of the threat of terrorism and implementation of an all-hazards approach to public safety.

The media outreach serves the purpose of not only keeping the reporters well informed, who in turn inform the public about terrorism, but it enables C-TASC to provide the media a single point-of-contact on issues related to homeland security and terrorism.

The third target audience is the business community. The case for emergency preparedness needs to be made to the private sector, particularly sectors in which there has not been incentives for emergency preparedness. C-TASC should partner with associations, business schools and the insurance industry to spread the message and good information about emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection.

The fourth and last key audience is the need to include the state's minority population, specifically African-Americans, Hispanics, and any other minority group, in our preparation. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness messages, so C-TASC should take the lead in making sure the effective messages are reaching all of Indiana's audiences. Each sector of the population may have unique concerns and C-TASC should work to address these concerns. For example, statistics have shown a higher rate of distrust of the public health system among African-Americans, an issue of no small concern if a mass inoculation in large population areas needs to take place. Another example is the growing Hispanic population in Indiana and the lan-

guage and immigration issues that are important to that population. Yet another example is the significant Arab and Muslim population in Indiana and the need to build trusting relationships among our community to preserve our quality of life.

REASSESS SUPPORT AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

The State of Indiana provides vital support to agencies through the State Budget Agency, Legislative Services, Indiana Department of Administration, Personnel, Department of Information Technology, State Board of Accounts and Attorney General's Offices. Each of these agencies' work makes the homeland security work the C-TASC members do possible and accountable.

In a pilot effort to reexamine the way we conduct homeland security business and to address bureaucratic issues, C-TASC proposes asking each of these agencies to appoint specific individuals to handle the issues of law enforcement, emergency management, national guard and public health. In turn, C-TASC would ask these same people to meet quarterly to review issues and policies to offer a critical self-examination of the current business rules imposed on these agencies and to revise any procedures or propose changes to C-TASC for eventual legislative review. It is thought that the mere meeting of the minds may provide a forum for idea exchanges that allow the support systems to get the information they need to better perform their tasks so that we may perform ours.

APPENDIX 1—CHARTER

Description: Protect the citizens and assets of Indiana from terrorism.

Issue/Opportunity: Coordinate security, emergency response and public health policies to protect citizens and assets of Indiana from terrorism.

Goal: Coordinate polices across state jurisdictions and complement national and local initiatives to minimize the risk of terrorism and maximize an effective response to any act of terrorism.

Principal Project Objectives (what needs to be done to meet Goal)

- Increase capacity at the local level to deter security breaches and respond to catastrophic events
- Improve criminal justice information and communication systems (database, intelligence and training)
- Improve public and agricultural health information and communication systems
- Prepare the National Guard for incident response support
- Prepare emergency responders for catastrophic incidents
- Develop greater public health capacity
- Identify critical assets
- Develop best practices in protecting people and assets
- Integrate policies into national homeland security efforts

Benefits

- A safe and secure state;
- Educate and reassure the citizens of Indiana;
- Sharing resources between agencies improves teamwork and saves money;
- Policy review and implementation improves underlying mission of agencies to serve the public, whether it is in improved health care, civil defense or law enforcement;
- Sets an example for local government;
- Contributions to national homeland security efforts leads to a safer Indiana and an ability for others to aid us as we may aid them

Principal Project Deliverables

- Project Charter
- National Governor's Association Heartland Security Project
- Training materials and technical assistance
- Clear and consistent media message
- Information technology and technology implementation
- Integrated plans based on economic sectors and department functions (e.g. SEMA Indiana Domestic Preparedness Strategy, Rural Security Task Force)
- Integrated command and control structure for state security and response forces
- Integrated rules and regulations with federal and local government
- Legislation
- Annual Report
- Funding for necessary security and response measures

Project Interdependencies & Inputs (why and how items get on the agenda)

- Accountability to public officials
- Experience of the shareholders and resources
- Consultant experts
- Federal initiatives and funding
- Practices in other states
- Common-sense
- Recognition of new value to existing programs
- Adoption of worthwhile private sector initiatives
- Advocacy by special interest groups

Project Issues and Risks

- Efficient allocation of capital
- I.C. § 4-3-20 (establish C-TASC)
- Success of terrorists
- Balancing security with civil liberties
- Complacency and false sense of security
- Communication between numerous actors and resources
- Recognizing security is blind to motive of the perpetrator or threat
- Finite resources and infinite options (threats)
- Competing priorities for attention and resources of shareholders

Critical Success Factors (Key Performance Indicators)

- Stakeholder approval of project deliverables
- Completion of project deliverables
- Effectiveness of IT and technology implementation
- Feedback from local emergency responders, law enforcement and elected officials
- Recognition from other states and national organizations
- Investigation leads and criminal convictions

APPENDIX 2—ADVISORY GROUPS

Counter-Terrorism and Security Council

Lieutenant Governor Joseph E. Kernan

Clifford Ong
Director, Counter-Terrorism and Security Council

George Buskirk
Adjutant General, Military Department of Indiana

Tracy Boatwright
State Fire Marshal, Office of the Fire Marshal

Pat Ralston
Director, State Emergency Management Agency

Thomas V. Fuentes
Special Agent in Charge—FBI

Susan Brooks
United States Attorney Southern District

Joseph Van Bokkelen
United States Attorney Northern District

Melvin Carraway
Superintendent, Indiana State Police

Representative Scott Reske
Indiana House of Representatives

Senator Tom Wyss
Senate Appointee

Catherine O'Connor
Executive Director, Criminal Justice Institute

Bill McCarty
Commission Chairman, Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission

Bryan Nicol
Commissioner, Indiana Department of Transportation

Joe Pearson
Assistant Commissioner, Indiana Department of Agriculture

Greg Wilson, MD
Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health

Lori Kaplan
Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management

Edward Najam, Jr.
Appellate Court Judge, Judiciary

Oatess Archey
Sheriff Grant County

Joseph Smith Sr.
Executive Director, Indiana Commission on Community Service & Volunteerism

Heavy Industry and Utility Task Force
Listed by Subcommittees

Confidentiality
Mike Huff - Chair
GE Plastics

Anne Becker
Utility Consumer Counselor

Anne Mullen O'Connor
Public Access Counselor

Phil Roberts
Deputy Director, SEMA

Keith Robinson
Bureau Chief

Don Wray
Information Technology Oversight Commission

Tom Morton
Indiana Association of Cities and Towns

Preparedness/Mitigation

Dillard Howell - Chair
Lilly Corporate Center

John Kopplin
Indiana Telecommunications Association

Phil Roberts
Deputy Director, SEMA

Richard Douglas
US Steel

John Fekete
Director, Environmental Affairs

Mike Huff
GE Plastics

Kurt Keiser
Bethlehem Steel

Stanley Sorrels
Manager, HSE Whiting Business Unit

Transportation

Rich Cooper - Chair
COO, Ports of Indiana

Kenny Cragen
Indiana Motor Truck Association, Inc.

Phil Roberts
Deputy Director, SEMA

Jim Williams
Chair, AWWA

Hank Cox
CSX Transportation

Maggie McShane
Indiana Petroleum Council

Bryan Nicol
Commissioner, Indiana Department of Transportation

Utilities/Infrastructure

Anne Becker
Utility Consumer Counselor

Raj Rao
Indiana Municipal Power Agency

Phil Roberts
Deputy Director, SEMA

Mark Ryan
CMS Energy

Greg Schenkel
Indiana Gas Association

Ed Simcox
Indiana Electric Association

Bob Enoch
Spectraline, Inc.

Tom Mahaney
SBC National Homeland Security Preparedness

Niles Parker
Director of Energy & Policy
Department of Commerce

Trever Powers
GPD Group

Don Wray
Information Technology Oversight Commission

Indiana Agriculture Security Task Force Committee Members

Phil Anderson
Indiana Beef Cattle Association

Eli Asem
Purdue University School of Veterinary Medicine

Michael Baise
Indiana Farm Bureau Inc.

John Baugh
Purdue University School of Agriculture

Bob Benson
Indiana Grain Buyers and Warehouse Licensing Agency

Paul Brennan
Indiana State Poultry Association

Steve Cain
Purdue Extension Service

Bruce Clear
Indiana Department of Natural Resources

Francisco Collazo-Mattei
USDA Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

Wayne Dillman
Indiana Farmers Union

David Barrabee
State Emergency Management Agency

Terry Fleck
Indiana Pork Producers Association

John Goss
Indiana Department of Natural Resources

Alan Hanks
Office of the Indiana State Chemist

Jane Hardisty
USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service

Dan Harper
Mapleleaf Farms

Cresswell Hizer
Indiana Agribusiness Associations

Stephen Hooser
Purdue Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

James Howell
Indiana State Department of Health

Lori Kaplan
Indiana Department of Environmental Management

Joe Lackey
Indiana Grocery and Convenience Store Association

Victor Lechtenberg
Purdue University School of Agriculture

John Livengood
Livengood and Associates

Bret Marsh
Indiana Board of Animal Health

Doug Metcalf
Indiana Board of Animal Health

Ed Nelson
Indiana Packers Corporation

Phil Nelson
Purdue University Food Science Department

John Nidlinger
USDA Farm Service Agency

Clifford Ong
Counter-Terrorism and Security Council

Joseph R. Pearson
Office of the Commissioner of Agriculture

David Petritz
Purdue Extension Service

Pat Ralston
State Emergency Management Agency

Phil Roberts
State Emergency Management Agency

Jake Secor
Dow AgroSciences

Gary Simon
USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine

Leon Thacker
Purdue Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

Randy Woodson
Purdue University School of Agriculture

Mike Yoder
Indiana State Dairy Association

Julia Wickard
Executive Director, Indiana Commission for Agriculture and Rural Development
in the Office of the Commissioner of Agriculture

Hospital Preparedness Task Force Committee

Donald A. Dian, M.D.
County Health Officer
Wells County Health Department

Virginia A., Caine, M.D.
County Health Officer
Marion County Health Department

Michael S. Garvey, Executive Director
Emergency Medical Services Commission
State Emergency Management Agency

Arthur L. Logsdon, J.D., President
Indiana Health Care Association

Spencer L. Grover Vice-President
Indiana Hospital & Health Association

R. Frank Shelton, Executive Director
Indiana Rural Health Association

B. J. Isaacson Chaves, Executive Director
Indiana Primary Health Care Association

Vicki VanDeventer, RN, President
Indiana Chapter
Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc.
Bloomington Hospital & Healthcare System

Mary L. Browning, RN, President
Indiana Organization of Nurse Executives
Community Health Network

Suellyn Sorensen, President
Indiana Society of Health System Pharmacists
Clarian Health, IU

Tim Adams, President
Indiana Society for Healthcare Engineers
Bloomington Hospital & Healthcare System

Hospital Members:

Erick Eastes, Safety Director
Richard L. Roudebush VA Medical Center

(for Robert H. Sabin, Medical Center Director)

Richard L. Johansen, CHE, Administrator
St. Vincent Clay Hospital

Char Roberts, Safety Officer
Margaret Mary Community Hospital

(For James L. Amos, President)

Thomas Firks, Dir. Emergency Medicine
Riverview Hospital

(For Seward A. Horner, President)

Kevin Doolin, Service Manager
Regional Coordination Center for EMS
The Methodist Hospitals, Inc., Northlake Campus

(For John H. Bentjemann, President)

Fred Horlander, V-P Support Services & Safety Officer
Clark Memorial Hospital

(For Timothy. L Jarm, CEO)

Keith Kahre, EMS Coordinator
St.. Mary's Health Care Services (East)

(For Kathleen M Korbelek, President)

James Christopher, Safety Director & EMS Coordinator
St. Francis Hospital & Health Centers

(For Robert J. Brody, President/CEO)

Ex-Officio State of Indiana

Clifford Ong, Director
Counter-Terrorism and Security Council

Robert Sunman
Indiana State Office of Rural Health

Gregory A. Wilson, M.D., State Health Commissioner
Indiana State Department of Health

Joe Hunt, M.P.H., Assistant Commissioner. Information Services and Policy Commission
Indiana State Department of Health

Roland Gamache, Jr., Ph.D., M.B.A., Director, Public Health Preparedness
Indiana State Department of Health

John A. Braeckel, M.S., Coordinator, Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Planning
Indiana State Department of Health

Elizabeth Hamilton-Byrd, M.D., Acting Medical Director, HBPP
Indiana State Department of Health

Bio-terrorism Task Force Committee

Steve Adams, Director, Strategic Development
Hoosier Uplands Economic Development Corporation

Mike Bigler, Chief Deputy
Indiana Office of the Fire Marshal

B. J. Isaacson Chaves, Executive Director
Indiana Primary Health Care Association, Inc.

Daymon W. Evans, M.D., M.P.H.
Community Health Network

Sandra Fights, R.N., President
Indiana State Nurses Association

Bert Furbree, M.D., Medical Director
Indiana Poison Control Center

Roland Gamache, Director
Public Health Preparedness and Emergency Response Division
Indiana State Department of Health

Michael Garvey, EMT-P, Deputy Director
Indiana State Emergency Management Agency

Sheriff William Harris, President
Indiana Sheriff's Association, Inc.

Joe Hunt, Assistant Commissioner
Information Services and Policy Commission
Indiana State Department of Health

Ken Hurless, President
Indiana Pharmacists Alliance

Stephen J. Jay, M.D., Chair
Department of Public Health
Indiana University School of Medicine

James Jones, Chief Executive Officer
Indiana Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc.

Jerry King, Executive Director
Indiana Public Health Association

Deborah McMahan, M.D., Health Officer
Allen County Health Department

Marilyn Morrison, President
Indiana Association of Cities and Towns

Ronald Murphy, Administrator
Scott County Health Department

Donna Oeding, Environmental Health Specialist
Dubois County Health Department

Clifford Ong, Director
Indiana Counter-Terrorism and Security Council

Dallas Peak, M.D., FACEP
Methodist Hospital and Trauma Center

Edward L. Probst, M.D., President
Indiana State Medical Association

Sharon Pygman, Chief Executive Officer
Health Care Excel

Patrick Ralston, Executive Director
Indiana State Emergency Management Agency

Frederick R. Ridge, M.D., President
Indiana Association of Public Health Physicians

Robert Sabin, Director
Richard L. Roudebush Medical Center

Kathy Schoettlin
Southwestern Indiana Chapter of the American Red Cross

Frank Shelton, Executive Director
Indiana Rural Health Association

Kenneth G. Stella, President
Indiana Hospital & Health Association

Stephen D. Tharp, M.D., Health Officer
Clinton County Health Department

John Viernes, Deputy Director—Office of Public Policy
Division of Mental Health and Addiction, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration

Gregory A. Wilson, M.D.
Indiana State Health Commissioner
Indiana State Department of Health


John Zentz, President
Association of Indiana Counties

State Bomb Technician Units

Map does not include federal agencies and Crane NSWC, which have bomb technicians that can support state agencies.


AGENCIES

- # Police Dept. P.D.
- # Sheriff Dept. S.D.
- # Ind. State Police ISP



APPENDIX 4—EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CAPACITY



APPENDIX 5—

Primary Agency Responsibility

A list of the strategic elements and designated agency responsible for the element. The agency is subject to change, and responsibilities may shift between the primary and secondary agency as needed. All agencies should support these elements as much as possible, regardless of whether they are identified or not.

	Primary	Secondary	Secondary
Warning System	ISP	SEMA	
EOD Support	ISP	SEMA	
FBI/DOJ Support	ISP		
Security Specialist	C-TASC		
I.D. Critical Assets	NG		
Business Case	C-TASC		
Task Forces	DOIT, INDOT, Ag		
Prepare CBRN	ISDH	SEMA	NG
Prepare NG	NG		
Agro-Security Plan	SEMA	Comm. on Ag	NG
Baseline Emerg. Response	SEMA		
Cross-Jurisdictional Training	SEMA	NG	
Citizen Participation	Citizen Corp Council	SEMA	ISDH
Expand LEPCs	SEMA		
IndianaMap	C-TASC		
SAFE-T	IPSC		
INDERN	C-TASC	SEMA	ISP
CJIS	CJI		
Track Legal Issues	C-TASC		
Public Record Access	C-TASC		
Mutual Aid Agreements	SEMA		
COG/COOP	SEMA		
Project Management	C-TASC		
Public Safety Training	C-TASC		
Commitment to Urban Areas	All Agencies		
C-TASC: 3 Cs	C-TASC		
Support Agency Network	C-TASC		

APPENDIX 6 — STRATEGY RELATIONSHIPS

STRATEGY RELATIONSHIP WEB

This web-chart is presented to highlight the unique interrelationships in the strategic plan. It is only an example of how the projects are related to one another. Many relationships exist that are not shown.

